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Abstract 
 
We empirically analyze the prevalence and economic underpinnings of closing price 
manipulation and its detection.  We estimate that approximately one percent of closing prices 
are manipulated, of which only a small fraction is detected and prosecuted.  We find that 
stocks with high levels of information asymmetry and mid to low levels of liquidity are most 
likely to be manipulated.  A significant proportion of manipulation occurs on month/ quarter-
end days.  Manipulation on these days is more likely in stocks with high levels of institutional 
ownership.  Government regulatory budget has a strong effect on both manipulation and 
detection.   
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1. Introduction  
 Market manipulation is detrimental to stock markets and their participants.  
Manipulation harms investor confidence and discourages investor participation in markets.  
This harms liquidity, increases trading costs and can increase the cost of capital for listed 
companies.  Manipulation distorts prices, thereby reducing market efficiency and causes 
deadweight economic losses from distorted resource allocation (Pirrong, 1995).  Market 
operators and regulators around the world expend significant resources to ensure they have 
adequate systems and processes to detect, investigate and prosecute market manipulation 
(IOSCO, 2000). 
Despite its detrimental effects and the costs of regulation, there is only limited 
empirical research on market manipulation.  This is partly due to the fact that manipulation is 
illegal (Cumming et al., 2011) and only a small fraction of manipulation is detected and 
prosecuted by market regulators.  Thel (1994, p. 287) points out “[w]e do not know how 
often prices are manipulated, how much harm manipulation does or how existing 
manipulation rules influence behavior”.  The incentives, means and opportunities to carry out 
new manipulation schemes are continually evolving (IOSCO, 2000). 
This paper focuses on a subset of manipulation – closing price manipulation.  We 
focus on this form of manipulation due to the importance of closing prices.  Closing prices 
are used in a large number of financial contracts and are widely followed by investors.  This 
creates incentives for many different parties to manipulate closing prices by aggressively 
buying or selling stock at the end of a trading day.  For example, mutual fund net asset values 
and fund performance are often calculated using closing prices.  The performance of a fund 
determines its ranking relative to competitors and is also commonly used to determine fund 
manager remuneration.  Given these incentives it comes as little surprise that some fund 
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managers manipulate closing prices.1  Closing prices have also been manipulated to profit 
from positions in stock derivatives2 and by brokers attempting to improve the appearance of 
their execution ability.3  Closing prices have been manipulated during pricing periods for 
seasoned equity issues and takeovers, to maintain listing on an exchange with minimum price 
requirements, to avoid margin calls, and on stock index rebalancing days to gain inclusion in 
an index.   
Manipulation of closing prices makes them a less accurate measure of a stock’s value, 
and therefore creates negative externalities for agents using these prices for benchmarking, 
contracting and trading purposes (Ben-David et al., 2011).  By reducing the frequency of 
manipulation and the associated negative externalities, regulation can increase aggregate 
welfare.  These benefits need to be balanced against the costs of regulation and therefore the 
socially optimal level of enforcement is a function of the frequency of manipulation, among 
other factors (DeMarzo et al., 1998).   
Although market participants perceive closing price manipulation to be common, we 
are not aware of any attempts to estimate the prevalence of manipulation or its detection.4  If 
                                                 
1 This type of manipulation is commonly conducted on the last day of a reporting period such as a month-
end or quarter-end.  See Carhart et al. (2002), Bernhardt and Davies (2005).  This practice is also known as 
‘marking the close’, ‘painting the tape’, ‘high closing’, ‘marking up’ or ‘portfolio pumping’.  Another 
reason for manipulation by fund managers is to influence the net asset value at which money enters and 
exits the fund. 
2 See, for example, Kumar and Seppi (1992) and Ni et al. (2005). 
3 See, for example, Hillion and Suominen (2004). 
4  For example, an article in news magazine Maclean’s (July 10, 2000, Vol. 113 No. 28, page 39) comments 
“nearly everyone seems to agree that high closing is common”.  An article in Financial News (“Mutual 
funds come under fire”, September 21, 2003) states “in the US the prevalence of the closing price 
manipulation has yet to be established, although Spitzer [Eliot Spitzer, New York state Attorney-General] 
claims that incriminating evidence is pouring in at an unexpectedly high rate.” 
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investors perceive the frequency of manipulation to be higher than the actual level then they 
will be unnecessarily discouraged from participating in the market.5  Similarly, although we 
know some of the reasons why closing prices are manipulated, the relative importance of the 
various reasons and the nature of stocks most likely to be affected by manipulation are not 
well understood.  A better understanding of these issues would not only help regulators to be 
more effective at detecting and deterring manipulation, but also allow a better assessment of 
the social costs of closing price manipulation and the types of stocks that are most likely to be 
affected by the negative externalities.  Understanding when and in which stocks manipulation 
is most likely to occur also has implications for financial contract design, which involves 
balancing the costs of more complexity against the benefits of increased robustness to 
manipulation attempts (e.g., moving from closing prices to volume-weighted average prices, 
“manipulation-proof” performance measures (Goetzmann et al., 2007), and using call 
auctions to determine closing prices (Hillion and Suominen, 2004)). 
 This paper is the first to analyze empirically the factors that drive closing price 
manipulation and its detection, and estimate its prevalence in stock markets.  We hand collect 
a sample of actual manipulation cases and use detection controlled estimation methods that 
explicitly take into consideration that only a non-random subset of manipulation is detected 
and prosecuted.  Our sample of prosecuted manipulation cases is from four US and Canadian 
stock exchanges: the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the American Stock Exchange 
(AMEX), the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) and the TSX Venture Exchange (TSX-V).  We 
do not seek to resolve the debate about what constitutes market manipulation (e.g., Fischel 
and Ross, 1991; Kyle and Viswanathan, 2008).  For the purpose of our analysis we simply 
adopt the US and Canadian regulators’ definition. 
                                                 
5 Following the 1987 stock market crash the NYSE established a panel of experts to review market 
volatility and investor confidence.  The panel highlighted the importance of enhancing regulatory capacity 
to detect and punish manipulative activities, but also commented on the need for the market to “hear the 
facts” about the extent of manipulative and abusive activities. 
 5
 We estimate that for each prosecuted instance of closing price manipulation 
approximately 308 to 326 instances of manipulation remain undetected or not prosecuted and 
that this rate differs substantially across exchanges.  We find that stocks with high levels of 
information asymmetry and mid to low levels of liquidity are most likely to be manipulated.  
A significant proportion of manipulation occurs on month-end and quarter-end days. In 
addition, a high proportion of mutual fund ownership increases the likelihood that a stock is 
manipulated at month/quarter end.  We also find that manipulators dislike idiosyncratic 
volatility, possibly because it increases the risk of both the manipulation being unsuccessful 
and the stock drawing the attention of regulators.  We also find that larger government 
regulatory budgets increase the rate of prosecution and deter manipulation.   
 Our estimates of the fraction of manipulation that remains undetected are useful in 
evaluating the effectiveness of regulation.  The insights into what drives manipulation have 
implications for improving regulatory efficiency by focusing regulatory effort where 
manipulation is most likely.  This study provides an instrument to calculate the probability of 
manipulation that has not been detected or prosecuted.  It can be used to study undetected 
manipulation and refine alerting parameters of market surveillance systems.   
 This paper is related to the small number of empirical studies of market manipulation 
cases, such as corners (Allen et al., 2006), squeezes (Merrick et al., 2005; Jegadeesh, 1993; 
Jordan and Jordan, 1996), the stock pools of the 1920s (Mahoney, 1999; Jiang et al., 2005) 
and ‘pump-and-dump’ manipulation (Aggarwal and Wu, 2006).  Each of these forms of 
market manipulation is quite different in nature from closing price manipulation and therefore 
our paper complements this literature, rather than overlaps it.  The only other empirical study 
to examine a systematic sample of closing price manipulation cases is Comerton-Forde and 
Putniņš (2011a).  In contrast to the present study which analyses the determinants and 
frequency of closing price manipulation, Comerton-Forde and Putniņš (2011a) examine the 
effects of closing price manipulation.  They find that manipulation is associated with large 
increases in day-end returns, return reversals, trading activity and bid-ask spreads.  A further 
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difference from existing studies is our use of econometric techniques that overcome the 
biases caused by incomplete detection.  This is particularly important given the small fraction 
of closing price manipulation that is prosecuted.   
 The paper proceeds as follows.  The next section defines the empirical model.  
Sections 3 and 4 describe the variables and data.  In Section 5 we present results, discuss 
implications and conduct a number of robustness tests.  The paper’s final section offers some 
conclusions. 
 
2. Empirical Model of Manipulation and Detection 
2.1 THE ECONOMETRIC PROBLEMS CAUSED BY INCOMPLETE DETECTION 
 Analyzing prosecuted violations without accounting for the non-random detection 
and prosecution processes can lead to substantial biases in inference about the characteristics 
or frequency of violations.  This problem is overlooked or inadequately addressed in much of 
the empirical literature.  For example, Aggarwal and Wu (2006) analyze a sample of ‘pump-
and-dump’ manipulation cases prosecuted by the SEC.  If cases of manipulation that cause 
large price changes are more likely to be detected and prosecuted by the SEC, then the 
inferences of Aggarwal and Wu about the effect of manipulation on prices, or what types of 
stocks are more likely to be manipulated, are potentially significantly biased.  The difficulty 
in estimating the underlying rate of violations (consisting of detected and undetected 
violations) is more obvious – if undetected violations cannot be observed, how can we infer 
what fraction goes undetected?   
 The econometric problems caused by incomplete detection are well documented by 
Feinstein (1990, 1991).  To overcome these problems, Feinstein (1990) develops detection 
controlled estimation (DCE) methods that allow inference about undetected violations, which 
are not directly observable.  The idea behind DCE is simple: jointly estimating models of the 
detection and violation processes explicitly allows for incomplete detection.  In its simplest 
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form, a DCE model is a system of two simultaneously estimated equations: one modeling 
violation and the other modeling detection conditional on violation having occurred.6   
 
2.2 NUMERICAL EXAMPLE OF INCOMPLETE DETECTION AND MODEL 
IDENTIFICATION 
 The intuition of how jointly estimating the detection and violation processes allows 
unbiased inference about unobservable characteristics and frequencies is not straight forward.  
We therefore provide a simple numerical example of incomplete detection to illustrate the 
intuition of how identification works in our econometric model. 
 Suppose that as illustrated in Table I Panel A in a population of 100 people 50 have 
high IQ and 50 have low IQ, and in each group 10 of the 50 people are manipulators.  The 
true frequency of manipulators in the population is 20/100 = 20% and IQ has no effect on the 
likelihood of being a manipulator because Pr(Manipulator | High IQ) =  Pr(Manipulator | Low 
IQ) = 10/50 = 20%.  Suppose also that manipulators differ in some systematic way, for 
example, they have lower risk aversion than non-manipulators. 
 Now suppose 9 out of the 10 low-IQ manipulators are caught and prosecuted, but 
only 1 out of the 10 high-IQ manipulators is caught and prosecuted (as illustrated in Table I 
Panel B) because the high-IQ manipulators are better at avoiding detection or concealing 
incriminating evidence that is required for successful prosecution.  If we were to ignore 
incomplete detection and simply use the observed prosecution cases to study the effects of IQ 
on the likelihood of being a manipulator we would conclude that Pr(Manipulator | High IQ) = 
                                                 
6 The DCE model is similar to Heckman-style selection bias correcting models in that both explicitly model 
the process that causes the sample to be a non-random subset of the population.  However, Heckman-style 
models are not suited to incomplete detection problems.  The reason is that one of the outcomes of the 
selection process, undetected or not prosecuted manipulation, cannot be directly observed as it would be in 
a Heckman-style application (non-respondents in survey data, for example). 
 8
1/50 = 2% and Pr(Manipulator | Low IQ) = 9/50 = 18% and therefore that having low IQ 
makes a person significantly more likely (18%-2% = 16 percentage points) to be a 
manipulator.  We would estimate the frequency of manipulators in the population as 
(9+1)/100 = 10%; half that of the true manipulator frequency of 20%.  This illustrates the bias 
in inference about the characteristics and frequency of manipulation when there is a failure to 
explicitly account for incomplete detection.  
 How could we avoid or at least reduce the biases?  Suppose we know that IQ affects 
the probability that a manipulator is detected/prosecuted (but it does not affect the likelihood 
of being a manipulator), and the level of risk aversion affects the likelihood of being a 
manipulator (but it does not affect the probability that a manipulator is detected/prosecuted), 
although we do not know the direction or magnitude of either effect.  In the first step we 
could use the subsample in which detection rates appear to be higher (the low-IQ individuals, 
because there we have 9/50 prosecutions compared to 1/50 in the high-IQ group) to estimate 
how risk aversion (RA) affects the probability of being a manipulator.  Recall that there are 
10 manipulators in the low-IQ population (and manipulators have low RA) but only 9 are 
prosecuted, so we observe 9 manipulators and 10 low-RA individuals and therefore we 
estimate Pr(Manipulator | Low RA) = 9/10 = 90%.  In the second step we could estimate the 
number of high-IQ manipulators by using the inferred relation between RA and the likelihood 
of being a manipulator and the observation that 10 individuals in the high-IQ population have 
low RA, giving the estimate 10 x 90% = 9 manipulators.  Recall that incomplete detection 
was more pronounced in the high-IQ subsample and notice that we used the relation between 
RA and manipulative tendencies inferred from the subsample in which detection is more 
reliable to improve our estimate of the prevalence of manipulators in the high-IQ subsample.  
The improved estimates are consistent with the example’s underlying assumption that IQ has 
no effect on the likelihood of being a manipulator because Pr(Manipulator | High IQ) =  
Pr(Manipulator | Low IQ) = 9/50 = 18%, i.e., we have corrected the bias that existed 
previously.  The improved estimate of the frequency of manipulators in the population is 
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(9+9)/100 = 18%, which is substantially closer to the true frequency of 20% than the previous 
estimate of 10%. 
 This example is kept deliberately simple for the sake of illustration; therefore it is 
important to note a few points on how it relates to our detection controlled econometric 
model for manipulation.  In the example, the observations with a high detection rate are used 
to infer the characteristics of manipulators, which in turn are used to identify likely 
undetected manipulators.  However, in reality identification also works simultaneously in the 
other direction, i.e., observations with a high probability of manipulation are used to infer the 
characteristics of detection, which in turn are used to improve estimates of the characteristics 
of manipulators, and so forth.  In the econometric model inference about unobservable 
characteristics occurs in a simultaneous rather than a two-step procedure.  This also means 
that the model is able to produce unbiased estimates of the unobservable population 
parameters, whereas the example simply ‘improved’ on the naïve estimates by iterating 
through the described inference process once.  Similar to the example, the model requires that 
at least one variable predicts manipulation but not detection, or the other way round, but one 
does not need to know ex-ante the sign or magnitude of the relation.  The predictors of 
manipulation and detection need not be uncorrelated as was the case in the example, they can 
contain noise, and some variables can predict both manipulation and detection.   
Finally, inference is not limited to just the types of manipulation detected by 
regulators, as long as the different types of manipulation share some common characteristics.  
For example, suppose some fund managers and some options traders are manipulators, but 
regulators only detect and prosecute fund managers.  Fund managers would be 
overrepresented in the prosecution sample compared to options traders, allowing the model to 
infer that detection/prosecution rates are higher for fund managers.  The model would infer 
the general characteristics of manipulators (such as low risk aversion in the previous 
example) from the prosecuted fund managers and use those characteristics to identify the 
manipulating options traders that have not been prosecuted.  
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2.3 THE MODIFIED DETECTION CONTROLLED ESTIMATION MODEL 
 We modify the basic DCE model from Feinstein (1990) by separating the detection 
process into two stages.  Therefore, our model consists of three stages: manipulation, direct 
detection and indirect detection.   
 The reason for modeling detection as a two-stage process is as follows.  Exchanges 
and regulators operate real-time computer surveillance systems that generate alerts in 
response to ‘unusual’ or potentially manipulative behavior.  Different surveillance 
departments use different systems and set varied criteria and thresholds for determining 
unusual behavior.  However, all alerting systems use price and volume variables to identify 
instances of unusual behavior.  We refer to detection by automated surveillance systems as 
direct detection.  Once a trader has been detected for manipulating prices, further 
investigation of their trading records can reveal other instances of manipulation, attempted 
manipulation or conspiring manipulators that were not detected by automated surveillance 
system alerts.  Also, some instances of manipulation that do not trigger alerts in surveillance 
systems are brought to the attention of the regulator by complaints from market participants.  
We refer to detection of manipulation that does not trigger alerts in surveillance systems as 
indirect detection.   
 The manipulation sample contains examples of indirect detection: instances in which 
day-end returns are zero or even negative despite the manipulator’s intent to inflate the 
closing price.  These instances represent unsuccessful attempts at manipulation or cases in 
which the manipulator reduced a day-end price decrease, for example, by keeping prices flat 
when they would have fallen without the manipulative buying.  We model direct and indirect 
detection separately because their empirical characteristics are different.  For example, 
directly detected manipulation is likely to have a large abnormal return on the day of 
manipulation whereas indirectly detected manipulation will not.  
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 Prosecution is implicit in our model of detection.  Although the two processes could 
be modeled separately, such a model is likely to suffer from identification problems due to 
the lack of observable variables that affect detection but not prosecution or vice versa.  Such 
variables include, for example, whether incriminating telephone conversations are recorded 
or whether incentives and gain to the manipulator can be convincingly demonstrated in court.  
Therefore, we model detection and prosecution as a single process and simply refer to this as 
detection, consistent with other DCE models in the literature.   
 The propensity for closing price i (the closing price of a particular stock on a 
particular day) to be manipulated is modeled as a continuous latent variable,

iY1 , that is a 
function of market-, stock- and time-specific attributes, iX 1 . 
iii XY 1111  
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iY1  is the binary variable for whether closing price i has been manipulated.  iY1  cannot be 
directly observed if detection is incomplete.  Instead, we observe closing prices that have 
been manipulated and detected. 
 Conditional on manipulation having occurred, the propensity for manipulation of 
closing price i to be directly detected by a regulator is modeled as a continuous latent 
variable,

iY2 , that is a function of market-, stock- and time-specific attributes, iX 2 . 
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Similarly, iY2  is the binary variable for whether manipulated closing price i is directly 
detected.   
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 Conditional on manipulation having occurred and not being directly detected, the 
propensity for manipulation of closing price i to be indirectly detected is modeled as a 
continuous latent variable,

iY3 , that is a function of market-, stock- and time-specific 
attributes, iX 3 . 
iii XY 3333  

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0
0
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iY3  is the binary variable for whether the manipulated closing price i is indirectly detected. 
 
< Figure 1 here > 
 
 Figure 1 graphically illustrates our three-equation DCE model.  A sample of closing 
prices falls into two disjoint sets, A and Ac.  Set A consists of closing prices that have been 
manipulated and either directly or indirectly detected.  Set Ac consists of closing prices that 
have either not been manipulated or have been manipulated but have evaded both direct and 
indirect detection.  iY1 , iY2 and iY3 cannot be separately observed.  We observe sets A and Ac 
in a sample of data and estimate the model’s parameters using maximum likelihood, as in 
Poirier (1980) and Feinstein (1990).  The details and derivation of the likelihood function are 
in Appendix A. 
 
2.4 ALTERNATIVE MODELS 
 Identification in DCE models is achieved through predictor variables that are 
uniquely associated with one stage.  That is, variables that predict manipulation but not direct 
or indirect detection, variables that predict direct detection but not manipulation or indirect 
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detection and variables that predict indirect detection but not manipulation or direct 
detection.7  In order to find such variables we exploit the helpful fact that detection occurs 
after manipulation.  Variables that are only observed after manipulation can affect the ex-post 
probability of detection but not the ex-ante incentives to engage in manipulation and 
therefore provide a natural set of variables for identification (a similar approach is used by 
Wang (2012)).  Distinguishing between direct and indirect detection is more difficult because 
we do not have a clear temporal order to exploit.  Therefore, we estimate an alternative two-
equation model (similar to the original DCE model used in Feinstein (1989, 1990)) that 
allows detection to result from direct or indirect detection but makes no effort to distinguish 
between the two.  Appendix B contains the equations and likelihood function for this model.   
 Our DCE model, like the rest of the DCE literature, assumes errors are independently 
distributed.  In practice, the errors of one process (e.g., manipulation) may be correlated with 
the errors of another (e.g., detection), if expectations simultaneity exists and is not 
incorporated into the model.  For example, regulators may be more likely to investigate 
stock-days that have a higher probability of manipulation.  We therefore estimate a third 
model with expectations simultaneity in which we add the probability of manipulation, 
 11 iXM , to the right hand side of both detection equations.  This model allows the 
probability of a regulatory investigation to depend on the probability of manipulation.  
Appendix B contains the full set of equations and likelihood function.   
 
3. Variables and Model Specifications 
 Table II defines the independent variables used in our econometric models.  Most 
variables primarily influence either manipulation or detection, but have indirect effects on the 
other process due to interaction between manipulators and regulators.  For example, if fund 
managers manipulate closing prices at quarter-ends then a primary determinant of the 
                                                 
7 For a more formal discussion of the identification issue see Feinstein (1990).  
 14
probability of manipulation is whether or not a day is a quarter-end.  A regulator that is aware 
of this association is more likely to investigate suspicious trading on quarter-end days and 
therefore whether or not a day is a quarter-end is a secondary determinant of the probability 
of detecting manipulation.  We discuss variables according to their primary association - first 
those associated with manipulation, then detection and lastly both manipulation and 
detection.   
< Table II here > 
  
 An order can move prices for at least two reasons: (i) it mechanically moves price 
from the bid quote to the ask quote (or vice versa) or beyond the prevailing best quotes by 
executing the volume at the best quotes; and (ii) it conveys information and causes revision 
of beliefs about the value of the stock.  A manipulator can exploit one or both of these 
mechanisms to influence prices.  The ability to use the first mechanism to manipulate a stock 
price depends on the liquidity of the stock, which we measure using market capitalization, 
turnover, the Amihud (2002) illiquidity metric (ILLIQ), and bid-ask spread, although at no 
stage are all four variables included in a model at the same time.  The ability to use the 
second mechanism to manipulate a stock price depends on the degree of information 
asymmetry, which we measure using the number of analysts’ forecasts of the stock’s earnings 
(analyst coverage) and a dummy variable for whether or not the stock is included in a broad 
market index.  Some closing price manipulation is conducted by company insiders.  In 
addition to analyst coverage, monitoring by institutional investors may constrain insider 
manipulation.  We proxy for institutional holdings with the percentage of shares held by 
mutual funds. 
 We also include variables that capture various motivations for manipulation.  
Theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that stock prices are manipulated to profit from 
options on the underlying stock or from futures contracts on indices, particularly in the period 
immediately prior to expiry (e.g., Stoll and Whaley, 1991; Kumar and Seppi, 1992; Jarrow, 
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1994; and Ni et al., 2005).  Therefore, we include a dummy variable for whether or not a 
stock has listed options and a second dummy variable indicating, for stocks with listed 
options, whether it is the last trading day prior to expiry of the options.  Fund managers are 
known to manipulate closing prices at the end of reporting periods such as the last day of a 
month or a quarter (e.g., Carhart et al., 2002; Bernhardt and Davies, 2009; and Ben-David et 
al., 2011).  Therefore, we include dummy variables for the last trading day in each month and 
quarter, and interactions of the dummy variables with the percentage of shares held by mutual 
funds.  Closing prices are also known to have been manipulated to avoid margin calls and to 
maintain a stock’s listing on an exchange with a minimum price requirement.  These 
incentives for manipulation are triggered when a stock’s price falls to a critical level and 
therefore are more likely to occur following declines in a stock’s price.  We include a price 
trend variable (a stock’s rolling one-month return) to examine these two and other similar 
motivations related to price movements.  Finally, to investigate manipulation associated with 
secondary equity offerings (SEO), we include a dummy variable for one-month periods prior 
to each SEO issue.  The one-month window is likely to contain the SEO pricing periods, 
which is when closing prices might be manipulated.  
 Volatility is likely to have more than one effect on manipulation.  Hillion and 
Suominen (2004) suggest that broker execution ability is more valuable when volatility is 
higher and therefore high volatility leads to closing price manipulation by brokers that 
attempt to alter their customers’ inference about their execution ability.  However, volatility 
can also deter manipulators if, for example, manipulators perceive volatile stocks as more 
likely to attract the regulator’s attention.  This could occur due to an extreme day-end 
abnormal return or due to an overnight return that creates a return reversal.  Further, 
idiosyncratic volatility presents a risk to a manipulator because the stock price can move 
against them.  Our sample of prosecuted instances of manipulation contains cases in which, 
despite the manipulator’s intent to increase the price, the day-end return is negative.  We 
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measure idiosyncratic volatility using the standard deviation of residuals from a market 
model of returns. 
 The variables associated primarily with detection and prosecution include 
government regulatory budget and the number of closing price manipulation prosecutions in 
the previous year.  Government regulatory budgets, in our case the budgets of the SEC and 
the Ontario Securities Commission, determine the amount of resources available to conduct 
investigations and prepare cases for prosecution.  Therefore, larger regulatory budgets are 
likely to be associated with greater capacity to prosecute manipulation.8  The number of 
closing price manipulation prosecutions measures the effectiveness and experience of the 
regulator in detecting and prosecuting closing price manipulation. 
 Closing price manipulation is more likely to be directly detected when it causes 
abnormal trading characteristics that trigger alerts in automated market surveillance systems.  
The measures of abnormal trading characteristics that we use are abnormal day-end return, 
order imbalance at the end of the day (the amount of buyer initiated trading in excess of seller 
initiated trading), and price reversion (the return from the closing price to the following 
morning’s price).9  Manipulation affects these trading characteristics because in attempting to 
                                                 
8 Stock exchanges also have responsibility for manipulation surveillance, so government regulatory budget 
only measures part of the total amount spent on regulation and enforcement.  Despite this, government 
budgets are reasonable proxies for the total enforcement effort because as DeMarzo et al. (2005) illustrate 
self-regulatory organizations are likely to take into consideration the level of government-level regulation 
and set their enforcement at a level that is just enough to pre-empt government enforcement.  A potential 
problem with this measure of regulator budget is that it is endogenous, i.e., government regulatory budgets 
are increased in times or countries where manipulation is more widespread.  The consequence of this 
potential endogeneity is to underestimate regulation’s deterrence effect on manipulation. 
9 Abnormal day-end trading characteristics can also occur for many reasons other than manipulation, such 
as news arrivals at the end of the day.  These other causes of abnormal trading do not invalidate its relation 
with detection of manipulation because regardless of the cause, abnormal trading that triggers alerts in 
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influence the closing price manipulators typically buy or sell heavily in the last minutes 
before the close creating a liquidity imbalance (e.g., Comerton-Forde and Putniņš, 2011b), 
which may in turn induce other market participants to trade.10  Given overnight for new 
orders to enter the market and resolve the imbalance, prices often revert towards their original 
levels the following morning (e.g., Carhart et al., 2002).   
Many instances of manipulation, however, do not create the abnormal trading 
characteristics that trigger alerts, but can be detected through investigations of other instances 
of manipulation or investor complaints.  Such indirect detection is more likely if unusual 
trading patterns exist in near proximity (e.g., nearby days in the same stock) because the 
probability of an alert and subsequent investigation is higher.  Therefore, as determinants of 
indirect detection, we include measures of abnormal trading aggregated through time in a 
particular stock.11  In the two-equation model the direct and indirect detection variables are 
combined into a single detection equation, thereby reducing the potential problem of weak 
identification of direct and indirect detection. 
 
< Table III here> 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
market surveillance systems draws the attention of the regulator and therefore increases the probability that 
manipulation is detected.  Further, manipulation that is accompanied by abnormal trading characteristics 
such as price spikes and reversals, are more likely to be prosecuted (a process, which in our model is 
combined with detection) because one of the elements in proving manipulation in court is artificiality in 
prices or volumes, i.e., a distortion from ‘natural’ market characteristics. 
10 Manipulation can also be conducted using quotes to provide misleading signals of intentions to trade.  
Such forms of manipulation are also illegal and, if successful, are likely to be associated with similar 
characteristics, such as abnormal returns, increased volume and price reversion.  
11 We also construct measures of abnormal trading on a particular day aggregated across all stocks on the 
corresponding exchange, but find no relation with the probability of indirect detection. 
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 Table III specifies the variables in each equation.  We use two approaches to address 
the fact that many variables influence both manipulation and detection.  In models without 
expectations simultaneity (Models 1 and 2) we include some variables in both equations, for 
example, regulatory budget and number of manipulation prosecutions.  These variables 
measure the capacity and effectiveness of the regulator and, at the same time, affect the 
manipulator’s perceived probability of being caught.  The abnormal trading characteristics 
are not observed at the time a manipulator makes the decision to manipulate; they are 
observed only after the market close or during the following day and are therefore naturally 
excluded from the manipulation decision equation, thereby contributing to identification.12  
None of the primary determinants of manipulation are included in the detection equation.  In 
this regard the regulators in the first two models are somewhat naïve in that they do not take 
advantage of all the information available to them about the determinants of manipulation.  
However, the third model, which includes the probability of manipulation as a determinant of 
                                                 
12 Excluding the abnormal trading characteristics from the manipulation decision equation does not suggest 
that manipulators do not consider the impact of their trading on market characteristics such as price.  
Suppose a manipulator has the choice of trading aggressively, moderately, or not at all and the expected 
price impacts of the three choices are 4%, 2% and 0%, respectively.  In the absence of market surveillance 
the manipulator might choose to trade aggressively; in the presence of moderate surveillance, the 
manipulator might scale back and trade moderately, and in the presence of very strong surveillance the 
manipulator may choose not to manipulate.  The manipulator’s choice of trading strategy depends on the 
strength of surveillance and how the potential price impacts that the manipulator could create affect the 
probability of being detected/prosecuted.  Once a manipulator chooses a trading strategy his actions cause 
actual (observable) trading characteristics.  The actual trading characteristics depend on the manipulator’s 
actions but are not a determinant of the manipulator’s actions and are therefore not included in the 
manipulation equation, which consists of determinants of manipulation.  To test the sensitivity of our 
results to this argument we also estimate the models without abnormal return and with abnormal return in 
the manipulation equation.  The results are qualitatively similar to our main results. 
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the probability of detection, treats regulators as sophisticated in that they are aware of the 
probability of manipulation and use this information in their detection processes.   
 We test the key over-identifying restrictions using likelihood ratio tests as described 
by Dhrymes (1994).  We use the approach of Kadane (1974) to sequentially test blocks of 
exclusion restrictions.13  All of the tests fail to reject the null hypothesis that the exclusion 
restriction is valid, thereby supporting the theoretical motivation of our model specification 
and the requirements for identification of the models. 
 
4. Data  
 We construct samples of prosecuted closing price manipulation cases (events) and 
stock-days in which no manipulation is detected or prosecuted (non-events) using 
endogenous stratified sampling.  Due to the rare nature of events, we collect all available 
events and only a fraction of non-events.14   
 We manually collect all of the closing price manipulation cases detected and 
prosecuted by market regulators in the US and Canada in the period 1 January 1997 to 1 
January 2009.  We systematically identify the cases from searches of the litigation releases 
and filings of the market regulators SEC, OSC, RS, IDA, MFDA, IIROC, NYSE Reg and 
                                                 
13 Specifically, we test the exclusion of: (i) abnormal trading characteristics from the manipulation equation 
(Models 1, 2, 3); (ii) abnormal trading characteristics from the indirect detection equation (Models 1, 3); 
(iii) time-series aggregates of abnormal trading characteristics from the manipulation equation (Models 1, 
2, 3); (iv) time-series aggregates of abnormal trading characteristics from the direct detection equation 
(Models 1, 3); and (v) all of the above exclusions simultaneously. 
14 Endogenous stratified sampling is widely used to increase the precision of estimates (Cameron and 
Trivedi, 2005) and mitigate potential biases that can result from rare events (King and Zeng, 2001). 
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AMEX DRC15 and searches of the legal databases Lexis, Quicklaw and Westlaw.  From the 
appendices of SEC annual reports we obtain lists of the case names and filing dates of all the 
instances of market manipulation against which the SEC took legal action in the fiscal years 
1997 to 2005. We manually examine the litigation releases of each case in these lists to 
identify instances of closing price manipulation.  For cases in which insufficient details are 
provided by the market regulators we obtain court records and filings through the 
Administrative Office of the US Courts using the PACER service. 
 We eliminate cases from our sample if: (i) insufficient information is available to 
determine which stocks were manipulated on which days; (ii) the manipulation occurred in an 
over-the-counter market; (iii) the manipulated securities were not common stock; (iv) the 
manipulation did not involve trade-based techniques; (v) trade and quote data are not 
available; or (vi) the manipulated stocks do not have at least three months of trading prior to 
the start of manipulation.16  The final sample of detected and prosecuted closing price 
manipulation is composed of 184 instances of manipulation with complete data.  These 184 
instances of a stock manipulated on a particular day are obtained from eight independent 
legal cases, each containing multiple instances of closing price manipulation.   
 The prosecuted instances of closing price manipulation involve 31 stocks from four 
exchanges: NYSE, AMEX, TSX and TSX-V.  Although we examine litigation releases and 
filings between 1997 and 2009, the first and last instances of manipulation in our sample 
                                                 
15 The full names of these regulators are US Securities and Exchange Commission (USA), Ontario 
Securities Commission (Canada), Market Regulation Services Inc. (Canada), Investment Dealers 
Association (Canada), Mutual Funds Dealers Association (Canada), Investment Industry Regulatory 
Organization of Canada (Canada), NYSE Regulation Inc. (USA) and AMEX Division of Regulation and 
Compliance (USA), respectively. 
16 Although cases in which insufficient information is available to determine the manipulated stock and date 
cannot be included in the manipulation sample, they are included in the population count of prosecuted 
manipulation.  Consequently, these cases affect the estimates via their influence on the observation weights. 
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occur in 1998 and 2005, respectively.  The difference between the date of the last examined 
litigation release and filing and the date of the last instance of manipulation reflects the 
significant amount of time between when an instance of manipulation occurs and when it is 
finally prosecuted.  The case names, alleged misconduct and legal outcomes are described in 
Appendix C.  There is considerable variation in the manipulation cases with regard to the 
manipulator (e.g., fund manager, corporate insider, broker, shareholder, proprietary trader) 
and the motivation for manipulation.   
 To obtain the sample in which manipulation is not detected and not prosecuted, for 
each manipulated stock-day we take all other stock-days on the corresponding exchange in a 
period of one month up to and including the manipulation date.  After eliminating stock-days 
with missing or erroneous data, this sample includes 1,249,748 observations.   
 We obtain intra-day trade and quote data, expiry dates for listed options, and index 
composition data from the Thomson Reuters Tick History database maintained by the 
Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA).  We obtain the remaining data 
from Thomson Reuters Datastream, Thomson Reuters Mutual Fund Database, Thomson 
Reuters SDC Platinum and the websites of the regulators.  We apply normalizing 
transformations to the data as documented in Table II. 
 
< Table IV here > 
 
 Table IV reports means, standard deviations and medians of the variables for the 
sample of prosecuted closing price manipulations and the sample that does not contain 
prosecuted manipulation.  Ignoring the biases due to incomplete detection for now, the 
difference in means and medians between the two samples is consistent with our expectations 
for most variables.  The sample of detected and prosecuted manipulation involves less liquid 
stocks (lower market capitalization, turnover, larger spreads and higher ILLIQ), lower levels 
of institutional following (less analyst forecasts, index constituency and mutual fund 
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holdings), and lower idiosyncratic volatility.  Manipulation is more concentrated on month-
end and quarter-end days, as well as one-month periods prior to secondary equity offerings.  
The detected manipulation sample is also associated with lower government regulatory 
budgets, higher abnormal returns, greater price reversion and larger positive order 
imbalances, as well as higher aggregate levels of the abnormal trading variables on other days 
in the same stock.   
 
5. Results 
 First we present the estimated model coefficients and discuss the determinants of 
manipulation and detection.  Next, we use our models to estimate the frequency of 
manipulation and detection.  Finally, we report results of robustness tests.  
 
5.1 THE DETERMINANTS OF MANIPULATION AND DETECTION 
 We use two approaches to select variables for the final models from the large number 
of potential variables and alternative measures (e.g., the several proxies for liquidity).  In the 
first approach we include all of the variables suggested by theory (as specified in Table III), 
then remove insignificant variables and re-estimate the models.  The second approach is a 
forward stepwise variable selection procedure.17  Both approaches give similar sets of 
variables so we only report the results from the first procedure.  For robustness we also 
estimate models with alternative sets of variables including those not deemed to be 
significant by the stepwise procedure.   
                                                 
17 Starting with just the constant terms, in each iteration we add variables that result in the largest increase 
in log-likelihood and re-estimate the model.  This is repeated until additional variables do not yield a 
significant improvement in the log-likelihood.  The stepwise variable selection procedures result in a 
relatively large proportion of statistically significant coefficients because highly statistically insignificant 
variables are not included in the final specifications.  
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  Table V reports the coefficient estimates and marginal effects (in parentheses).18  For 
continuous variables, the marginal effects measure the percentage change in the probability 
of either manipulation, direct or indirect detection for a one percent change in the value of the 
independent variable.  The statistical significance of results in Table V assumes observations 
are independent.  Because the 184 instances of prosecuted manipulation in our sample are 
related to eight legal cases, the level of statistical significance reported in Table V is likely to 
be inflated.  Therefore, we place more emphasis on the economic significance of the 
magnitudes.  In robustness tests we apply a block-bootstrap procedure (to a subset of the 
sample due to computational constraints) that accounts for the relations between instances of 
prosecuted manipulation.  These tests suggest that although statistical significance in Table V 
may be inflated most variables in our model are statistically significant.   
 
< Table V here > 
 
 We find that government regulatory budget has a strong effect on both manipulation 
and detection.  Across all three models larger government regulatory budgets increase the 
probability of detecting and prosecuting manipulation and also decrease the probability of 
manipulation.  The latter effect is likely to be because increased regulatory capacity has a 
deterrence effect on manipulation.  This is consistent with the conclusions made by Pirrong 
(1995) based on a historical overview of manipulation under various regulatory regimes.  We 
estimate that a 1% increase in a government regulator’s real budget per stock results in a 
                                                 
18 Marginal effects are calculated as 2)1(
Pr
X
X
e
e
X 






, where: Pr is the estimated probability of 
manipulation, direct detection and indirect detection; 
  are the coefficient estimates; and X  are the 
observed variable values.  They are reported as a percentage of Pr.  Marginal effects are calculated for each 
observation and then averaged over the entire sample.   
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2.0% decrease in the amount of closing price manipulation and a 1.5% increase in the rate of 
prosecution.19  Because our models include dummy variables for each of the markets, the 
effect of budget on manipulation and detection is identified primarily through its time series 
variation.20  The Pearson correlation coefficients between real per-stock government 
regulatory budget and the number of closing price manipulation prosecutions filed by the 
regulator in a rolling one-year window are 0.81 and 0.47 in the US and Canada, respectively.  
This further illustrates the strong association between regulatory budgets and the probability 
of detection.  Real per-stock regulatory budgets in both the US and Canada have steadily 
increased during the past decade, increasing the probability of detection and putting 
downward pressure on the rate of manipulation. 
 The coefficients of the number of analyst forecasts and the index constituency 
dummy suggest that stocks with greater information asymmetry are more likely to be 
manipulated.  A 20% reduction in the number of analysts’ forecasts is estimated to increase 
the probability of manipulation by approximately 4%.  This finding holds across all three 
models and the two information asymmetry variables make the largest contribution to 
maximizing the model likelihood.  This result is consistent with theory (e.g., Allen and Gale, 
1992; Kumar and Seppi, 1992; and Aggarwal and Wu, 2006): information asymmetry makes 
it difficult for market participants to identify whether an aggressive buyer is an informed 
trader or a manipulator. 
Analysts, together with institutional investors, may constrain manipulation by 
corporate insiders through stronger monitoring of insiders’ actions.  Consistent with this 
                                                 
19 The former estimate is the average marginal effect across the three models and the later is from Model 2.  
Because Model 2 aggregates direct and indirect detection, it provides a single estimate for the effect of 
budget on the total amount of detection (direct and indirect).  Models 1 and 3 provide separate estimates for 
the effect of budget on direct and indirect detection. 
20 There is significant time series variation in regulator budgets.  In both the US and Canada the maximum 
value of real budget per stock is more than twice the minimum. 
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explanation, in addition to the negative relation between analyst coverage and manipulation, 
we also find a negative relation between mutual fund ownership and the propensity for 
manipulation.  A one standard deviation increase from the average mutual fund ownership (as 
a percentage of shares outstanding) is associated with an expected 9% decrease in the 
probability of manipulation. 
 The coefficients of the liquidity and illiquidity variables, market capitalization and 
ILLIQ, are positive and negative, respectively.21  The interpretation of this result is not 
straightforward.  The liquidity variables are correlated with the asymmetric information 
proxies.  Therefore, highly liquid stocks, which also tend to have low information 
asymmetry, are given a low probability of manipulation by the information asymmetry 
variables.  The positive (negative) coefficient of the liquidity (illiquidity) variable therefore 
suggests that manipulators do not favor the most illiquid stocks.  Taken together, the 
information asymmetry and liquidity coefficients suggest that manipulators generally prefer 
stocks that are at neither end of the liquidity spectrum.  To confirm this interpretation we re-
estimate the models replacing the continuous liquidity variables with quintile dummy 
variables.  We find that the probability of manipulation is highest for stocks in the third and 
fourth quintiles where the first quintile is defined as having the highest liquidity.  We 
conclude that manipulators favor stocks with mid to low levels of liquidity.   
 A likely explanation of the previous result is that highly liquid stocks are difficult to 
manipulate because of the high levels of trading activity, substantial order book depth and 
low information asymmetry.  Very illiquid stocks tend not to be favored by manipulators 
because they generally lack the incentives or magnitude of potential profits that mid-range 
and highly liquid stocks have.  For example, fund managers, in general, hold relatively liquid 
stocks and any illiquid stocks they may hold only represent a small proportion of their 
portfolios.  Therefore, manipulating the closing prices of very illiquid stocks is unlikely to 
give fund managers much benefit in overstating their portfolio’s performance.  Similarly, 
                                                 
21 Using spread as an alternative measure of liquidity produces similar results. 
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derivatives are less frequently available on very illiquid stocks and such stocks are typically 
not constituents of major indices.  Finally, brokers are more likely to manipulate stocks for 
the purpose of altering their clients’ inference of their execution ability when the clients and 
orders are large.  This seldom occurs in very illiquid stocks.  
 The results in Table V also indicate that stocks are significantly more likely to be 
manipulated on month-end and quarter-end days.  Carhart et al. (2002) present evidence that 
stock price manipulation on month-end and quarter-end days is largely attributable to fund 
managers.  Consistent with this explanation, the coefficients of the interaction terms 
involving month/quarter-end dummy variables and fund holdings are positive and statistically 
significant indicating that a high proportion of mutual fund ownership increases the 
likelihood that a stock is manipulated at month/quarter end.  Therefore, our results suggest 
that fund managers are associated with a significant proportion of all manipulation.   
On the other hand, the listed options dummy variables are not statistically significant 
in our model.  Because options tend to be listed on relatively liquid stocks, we do not rule out 
the possibility that options do affect manipulation but that this effect is overshadowed by the 
liquidity variables.  Whether a stock’s price has been increasing or decreasing over the prior 
month  does not have a significant effect on the likelihood of manipulation.  Similarly we do 
not find statistical evidence of a relationship between secondary equity offerings and closing 
price manipulation.  
 All else equal, idiosyncratic volatility reduces the likelihood of manipulation.  A 20% 
increase in the standard deviation of daily return residuals is estimated to decrease the 
probability of manipulation by 9%.  Because idiosyncratic volatility is negatively correlated 
with liquidity, it is important to note that this estimate is the expected effect when holding 
liquidity constant.22  This finding is consistent with the explanation that idiosyncratic 
                                                 
22 The correlation between idiosyncratic volatility and the liquidity proxies (market capitalization and 
turnover) is between -0.43 and -0.50.  The correlation between idiosyncratic volatility and the illiquidity 
proxies (bid-ask spread and ILLIQ) is between 0.51 and 0.71. 
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volatility deters manipulation because it increases the probability of an alert and subsequent 
regulatory investigation.  The negative relation could also be because, all else equal, stocks 
with high idiosyncratic volatility increase the risk to the manipulator that the stock price will 
move against them. 
 Turning to the variables that affect detection, in all three models the abnormal trading 
characteristics (abnormal return, reversion and order imbalance) increase the probability of 
direct detection.  The type of market closing mechanism is likely to affect the timing of 
manipulation-induced abnormal trading characteristics.  We therefore examine various day-
end windows (60, 30, 10 and 5 minutes before the close) and find that the results are 
consistent across the alternative lengths.23 
Indirect detection of manipulation in a particular stock-day is more likely when there 
is abnormal trading in that stock during a period of a few days either side of that day.  In 
particular, an instance of manipulation that is accompanied by a number of abnormal day-end 
returns and overnight price reversions in a period of two weeks has an increased probability 
of being indirectly detected.  The regulator notices the abnormal patterns in returns and upon 
investigation reveals instances of manipulation that did not trigger alerts in surveillance 
                                                 
23 In our sample the Canadian exchanges, TSX and TSX-V, have simple closing mechanisms: trade occurs 
continuously until 4:00pm at which time the market closes and the closing price is the price of the last 
trade.  The TSX introduced a closing call auction for some stocks, with a staggered implementation from 
March 2004.  This does not affect any of the observations in our sample because there are no prosecuted 
manipulation cases on the TSX after the introduction of the closing call auction.  The TSX-V introduced a 
closing call auction for some stocks from December 2011, after the end of our sample period.  The closing 
mechanisms on the NYSE and AMEX allow orders to be specified for execution at the closing price and 
the specialists intervene in setting closing prices.  Although the NYSE and AMEX closing procedures are 
sometimes described as auctions, they bear little resemblance to any other auction procedure (Hasbrouck, 
2007), particularly automated closing call auctions, such as the ones currently used at Euronext Paris and 
the London Stock Exchange, for example. 
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systems.  Combining direct and indirect detection into a single detection process, as in the 
two-equation model, produces similar results regarding the effect of the abnormal trading 
characteristics on the probability of detection.   
 The results from Model 3 suggest that ceteris paribus, i.e., after controlling for things 
such as the effect of abnormal trading characteristics on detection, the probability of detection 
increases as the probability of manipulation increases.  A positive relation suggests that 
regulators are aware of factors that influence the probability of manipulation and that they use 
this knowledge in detecting, investigating and prosecuting manipulation.  Adding the 
expectation simultaneity term in Model 3 does not substantially change the conclusions about 
the other determinants of manipulation and detection.  
 The exchange dummy variables are included in all equations to allow for different 
levels of manipulation and detection in each of the two countries (US and Canada) or in 
different exchanges within a country.  Industry dummy variables on the other hand are not 
included in the final models as they are generally not statistically significant.  The pseudo R2 
of the models, based on McFadden’s likelihood ratio (one minus the ratio of the log-
likelihood with all predictors and the log-likelihood with intercepts only) range from 0.17 to 
0.23. 
  
5.2 THE FREQUENCY OF MANIPULATION AND DETECTION 
 The three models of manipulation and detection allow estimation of the underlying 
rate of manipulation (detected and not detected) and the fraction of manipulation that remains 
undetected.  Denoting the parameter estimates by 
*
1 , 
*
2  and 
*
3 , applying Bayes’s law for 
the three-equation models gives the probability of an undetected manipulated closing price in 
the sample with no detected or prosecuted manipulation (set Ac) as: 
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where M( ), D( ) and I( ) are defined in Appendix A as the probabilities for manipulation, 
direct detection and indirect detection, respectively.  For the two-equation model the 
probability of an undetected manipulated closing price in set Ac is: 
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  These estimates of the probability of manipulation (given that manipulation has not 
been prosecuted) are useful in efficiently allocating regulators’ resources, particularly when 
resources are increased and it becomes possible to investigate additional cases of suspected 
manipulation.  These probability estimates can also be used to study the characteristics of 
undetected or not prosecuted closing price manipulation.   
 Using a similar approach to Feinstein (1990), the fraction of undetected manipulation 
in the population can be consistently estimated as: 
 





cAi
iii YYYTn
N
0,0|1Pr 321     (9) 
where T is the total number of observations in the population (the sum of the number of 
observations in sets A and Ac), N is the population number of observations in set Ac and n is 
the sample number of observations in set Ac. 
 Models 1 and 2 estimate the fraction of undetected closing price manipulation in the 
population as 1.14% and 1.08% of all stock-days, respectively.  The rate of detected and 
prosecuted manipulation in the population (number of observations in set A divided by T) is 
0.004%.  This suggests that there are many more instances of manipulation not prosecuted 
than there are prosecuted manipulations.  In fact, these estimates suggest that only about 
0.4% of all manipulation is prosecuted.  For every prosecuted closing price manipulation 
approximately 308 to 326 manipulations remain either undetected or not prosecuted.  Here 
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the limitation of modeling detection and prosecution together becomes clear – we cannot 
infer the fraction of the not prosecuted manipulation that was detected.  Adding the rates of 
prosecuted and not prosecuted manipulation, the underlying rate of manipulation in the 
population is estimated at 1.14% to 1.08% of stock-days.  This is not significantly different 
from the rate of manipulation that is not prosecuted, because only a small fraction of 
manipulation is prosecuted. 
 What explains the large difference between the total amount of manipulation and the 
amount of prosecuted manipulation?  We believe there are two main factors.  First, 
discussions with regulators and other anecdotal evidence indicate that a significant proportion 
of the manipulation detected by regulators is not prosecuted.  One of the main reasons for this 
is difficulty in obtaining sufficiently incriminating evidence.  Given that many non-
manipulative motivations for trading can lead to the same pattern of trades and market impact 
as manipulation, what distinguishes manipulative from non-manipulative trading is 
manipulative intent (see, for example, Ledgerwood and Carpenter, 2012).  In practice, 
proving manipulative intent often requires recorded telephone conversations or intercepted 
emails, which contain explicit statements of the manipulator’s intent.  In place of formal legal 
action, in some instances regulators with insufficient evidence simply warn the suspected 
manipulators about their suspicious trading patterns, thereby hoping to stop further 
manipulation.  As DeMarzo et al. (1998) point out, optimal enforcement must balance the 
benefits of enforcement against the costs, which in practice can be substantial, and therefore 
it is often optimal to pursue only a fraction of the possible cases.   
Second, many instances of manipulation are very difficult to detect.  Given the 
significant penalties for convicted manipulation (criminal charges) it is reasonable to expect 
that manipulators will only choose to do so when the probability of detection and prosecution 
is low.  To reduce the probability of detection manipulators scale back the aggressiveness of 
their trading and alter the timing of their trades to conceal their actions from the regulator 
(Comerton-Forde and Putniņš, 2011b).  Consistent with this explanation we find that: (i) 
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many instances of closing price manipulation do not cause easily detectable abnormal trading 
characteristics; and (ii) manipulation tends to take place when the probability of detection is 
exceptionally low.  For example, our prosecuted manipulation sample contains instances of 
zero or negative day-end returns despite the manipulator’s intent to increase the closing price.  
Similarly, in unreported results the day-end characteristics of a sub-sample consisting of the 
top 1% of stock-days by manipulation probability (estimated with the DCE Model 1) are not 
significantly different from those of other stock-days.  Furthermore, the average probability 
of direct (indirect) detection for the top 1% of stock-days by manipulation probability is only 
0.06% (0.00002%), whereas for other stock days it is 4.5% (5.6%).  Therefore, the low 
detection and prosecution rates are largely explained by the difficulties in detecting 
manipulation due to manipulators concealing their actions given the large potential penalties, 
and difficulties in proving manipulative intent once suspected manipulation has been 
identified.   
 
5.3 ROBUSTNESS AND VALIDATION TESTS 
 We examine the robustness of our results.  In our initial implementation, the 
disturbance terms, i1 , i2  and i3 , are assumed to be drawn from independent standard 
logistic distributions with probability density function  21)( 

 

 e
e
f .  To test the 
sensitivity of our results to this assumption we estimate the models using four alternative 
disturbance term distributions with fatter tails, thinner tails, a right skew and a left skew.24  
                                                 
24 The fat and thin tailed distributions are equal mixtures of a standard logistic distribution and a logistic 
distribution with larger or smaller scale parameter respectively.  Their probability density functions are 
given by    2/
/
2
1212
)(
s
s
es
e
e
e
f 



 



  with s=2 for the fat tailed distribution and s=0.5 for the thin 
tailed distribution.  The right and left skew distributions are generalized logistic distributions with 
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The marginal effects of most independent variables are very similar under the different 
disturbance term distributions, suggesting the results are not overly sensitive to the assumed 
disturbance term distribution. 
 The statistical significance of our main results may be affected by dependencies 
between observations causing clustering of errors.  This can occur due to manipulators 
targeting particular stocks or days multiple times, or due to our 184 instances of prosecuted 
manipulation being related to eight legal cases.  To address this concern we implement two 
versions of the bootstrap algorithm described in Cameron et al. (2011): (i) clustering standard 
errors by stock and by date (double clustering); and (ii) clustering standard errors by legal 
case.  The first version provides consistent standard errors under arbitrary two-way error 
clustering within stocks and dates and the second accounts for relations between observations 
related to the same legal case.  We run 500 repetitions of each bootstrap estimation.  Due to 
computational constraints we use a sample consisting of all of the detected manipulation 
observations and randomly selected 1% of the stock-days with no detected manipulation, 
adjusting observation weights accordingly. 
 Nonlinear maximum likelihood estimators can be biased in finite samples.  Although 
our total sample size is large, the number of manipulation and detection observations is 
relatively small due to the rare nature of these events.25  We examine the potential influence 
of finite-sample biases by estimating the bootstrap bias-corrected parameter estimates 
suggested by Efron and Tibsharani (1993) and Cameron and Trivedi (2005).  The difference 
                                                                                                                                                 
probability density   )1(1)( 

 be
be
f 

  and b=2 for the right skew distribution and b=0.5 for the left skew 
distribution. 
25 King and Zeng (2001) document a special case of the finite sample bias for rare events in logistic 
regression.  However, their results are not directly applicable to DCE models consisting of multiple 
simultaneous equations. 
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between the bias-corrected estimates and uncorrected estimates allow us to gauge the 
magnitude of the potential bias.   
< Table VI here > 
 
 Table VI reports the results of the bootstrap-based corrections for double-clustered 
errors and finite-sample bias.  The coefficient and marginal effect estimates using the reduced 
size sample are similar to those estimated using the full sample.  Despite the fact that the 
cluster-robust standard errors are larger on average, most coefficients remain statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  Similarly, the statistical significance when standard errors are 
clustered by legal case (results available upon request) is lower, but most of the variables 
remain statistically significant.  The bias-corrected estimates are similar to those without 
correction, suggesting finite-sample bias does not have a large influence on our estimates.   
 We also examine the robustness of our results to changes in the sample composition, 
the time period from which the sample is drawn, different model specifications and 
alternative variable definitions.  To test the sensitivity to the particular sample and time 
period we split our data into two sub-samples, first by time (earliest half of the data and latest 
half of the data) and then randomly, and estimate the model separately on each sub-sample.  
We also re-estimate our model using only post-decimalization data.  We test alternative 
model specifications by including the variables from Table II that are left out of the reported 
models.  We examine the sensitivity of the results to the way the variables are measured by 
replacing variables with their alternative definitions given in Table II.  We find that the main 
results hold in each of these robustness tests and therefore we do not report these results. 
 We conduct three simple validity tests of the main econometric model’s predictions.  
First, we expect manipulation to cluster on particular days and in particular stocks that are 
manipulated repeatedly.  Using the top 1% of predicted manipulation probabilities as a proxy 
for manipulated closing prices we examine the distribution of predicted manipulation across 
stocks and dates.  The distribution is far from uniform with pronounced clustering in 
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particular stocks and on particular dates, as expected.  This result holds even after excluding 
month-end and quarter-end days.  Second, we examine whether the model predicts 
manipulation in the lead up to prosecuted instances using a probit regression with prosecuted 
manipulation as the dependent variable and a dummy variable for whether the model predicts 
manipulation in a rolling window containing the past week as the independent variable.  We 
obtain a positive and statistically significant coefficient on the independent variable 
suggesting the model predicts manipulation in the week leading up to prosecuted instances of 
manipulation. 
 The third test is a form of leave-one-out cross-validation of out-of-sample predictive 
accuracy.  For each of the eight legal cases in turn we: (i) remove the case (and corresponding 
non-manipulated stock-days) from the sample; (ii) estimate the main DCE model (Model 1) 
on the remaining data; and (iii) use the model estimates to calculate for each closing price in 
the left out data the predicted probability that the closing price falls into the set of prosecuted 
manipulations (the probability that the closing price is manipulated and either directly or 
indirectly detected).  We examine the accuracy of the predicted probabilities using Receiver 
Operating Characteristics (ROC) analysis.  The Area Under the ROC curve (AUROC) 
measures the probability of correct prediction, independent of prior probabilities and 
classification thresholds.  Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000) suggest the following interpretation 
of AUROC values: around 0.5 implies the model performs no better than chance; 0.7-0.8 
implies acceptable classification performance; 0.8-0.9 implies excellent performance; and 
0.9-1.0 implies outstanding performance (rare).  For our main model the out-of-sample 
AUROC point estimate is 0.902, with a 95% confidence interval 0.870 to 0.934.  These 
results suggest our DCE model has excellent out-of-sample classification accuracy, 
supporting the validity of the model. 
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6. Conclusions 
 We examine the determinants of manipulation and its detection using methods that 
recognize that only a non-random subset of manipulation is detected and prosecuted.  Stocks 
with high levels of information asymmetry and mid to low levels of liquidity are most likely 
to be manipulated.  The probability of manipulation is higher on month-end and quarter-end 
days, particularly for stocks with relatively high levels of mutual fund ownership, suggesting 
fund managers account for a significant proportion of manipulation.  All else equal, 
manipulators dislike stocks with high levels of idiosyncratic volatility, possibly because of 
the risk that the stock will move against them or due to the increased likelihood of the stock 
triggering alerts and attracting the attention of a regulator.  Larger government regulatory 
budgets increase the rate of prosecution and significantly deter manipulation.  These insights 
help understand the underpinnings of closing price manipulation and allow regulatory effort 
to be focused where manipulation is most likely to occur.   
 We also find that only a small fraction of manipulation is detected and prosecuted.  
For each instance of prosecuted closing price manipulation we estimate that approximately 
308 to 326 instances of manipulation remain undetected or not prosecuted.  The amount of 
manipulation can be reduced by allocating additional resources to regulation.  The results 
suggest that a 1% increase in government regulatory budgets would result in an estimated 
2.0% decrease in the amount of closing price manipulation and a 1.5% increase in the rate of 
prosecution.  These estimates should be taken into account by policymakers when deciding 
on how much resources to allocate to regulation because as pointed out by DeMarzo et al. 
(1998) the socially optimal amount of enforcement depends on the frequency of violations 
and how violators, in our case manipulators, respond to increased enforcement. 
 All statistical methods are subject to some degree of estimation error and more 
difficult to quantify model error.  The statistical method used in this paper is no exception.  
Analogous to the way practitioners estimate the value of a company by using multiple 
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methods and taking the average or a range from the various estimates, we hope that future 
research will use alternative methods to estimate the prevalence of closing price 
manipulation, its determinants and how it responds to regulation.  Estimates from alternative 
methods will help reduce the uncertainty about model error and therefore increase confidence 
in the estimates.  As highlighted by this paper, it is important that methods explicitly address 
the problem of incomplete detection in order to avoid potentially significant biases in 
inference.    
 In future work it would be useful to extend the sample in time (the last instance of 
manipulation in our sample occurs in 2005, reflecting the time taken to bring cases to 
prosecution).  This would allow examination of how manipulation and detection have 
responded to several interesting market structure and regulatory changes, such as the 
introduction of a closing call auction for some stocks on the TSX and TSX-V, Regulation 
NMS for the US exchanges, and the tendency for surveillance and enforcement roles to shift 
from self-regulatory organizations such as stock exchanges to more centralized government-
level regulators.  Finally, this study provides an instrument to calculate the probability of 
manipulation that has not been prosecuted.  This instrument can be used to study the 
characteristics of undetected manipulation and refine alerting parameters of market 
surveillance systems.   
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Appendix A: Details of Model Estimation Procedure 
 We define M( ), D( ) and I( ) to be monotonic link functions that link 11 iX , 22 iX  
and 33 iX , to latent probabilities for manipulation, direct detection and indirect detection, 
respectively.26  That is,     
   1Pr 111  ii YXM        (A.1) 
   1|1Pr 1222  iii YYXD       (A.2) 
   0,1|1Pr 21333  iiii YYYXI      (A.3) 
Table A.I reports the probabilities of an observation (closing price) arriving at various 
joint outcomes (represented by cells in the table) of the manipulation and detection processes.  
The joint outcomes are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, so the probabilities in Table A.I 
sum to one.   
 
Table A.I. Modified detection controlled estimation model probabilities 
This table reports the probabilities of an observation (a closing price) arriving at various outcomes.  M( ) is 
the probability that a closing price is manipulated.  D( ) is the probability that a manipulated closing price is 
directly detected.  I( ) is the probability that a manipulated closing price is indirectly detected, given that it 
is not directly detected. 
  Manipulation 
  Manipulated Not manipulated 
Directly detected M( )D( ) 0 
Indirectly detected M( )[1 – D( )]I( ) 0 Detection 
Not detected M( )[1 – D( )][1 – I( )] 1 – M( ) 
    
 
In order to observe a detected manipulated closing price, the closing price must have 
been manipulated and either directly or indirectly detected.  These outcomes correspond to 
                                                 
26 In our implementation of this model the link functions are cumulative logistic distribution functions, that 
is,   1111 1 1  iXi eXM  ,   2222 1 1  iXi eXD   and   3333 1 1  iXi eXI  .  The disturbance terms, i1 , i2  
and i3 , are from independent logistic distributions with mean zero and variance 3
2
 (scale parameter of 
one).  In robustness tests we examine alternative distributions for the disturbance term. 
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the first two probability rows in Table A.I due to the simplifying assumption of no false 
detection.27  Therefore, the log-likelihood of the set of detected manipulated closing prices 
(set A), is: 
           


Ai
iiiiiA XIXDXMXDXML 3322112211 1loglog        (A.4) 
 Similarly, for a closing price in which manipulation has not been detected, either: (i) 
manipulation has not occurred; or (ii) manipulation has occurred and evaded both direct and 
indirect detection.  These outcomes correspond to third probability row in Table A.I.  
Therefore, the log-likelihood of the set of observations in which manipulation is not detected 
(set Ac): 
           


cAi
iiiicA
XIXDXMXML 33221111 111loglog      (A.5) 
The log-likelihood of the full sample is the sum of the log-likelihoods of the two sets of 
observations.  To estimate this model with data collected from endogenous stratified 
sampling (choice-based sampling) we add weights to the observations and the resulting 
weighted maximum-likelihood estimator (due to Manski and Lerman (1977)) becomes:  
           
           





cAi
iiiicA
Ai
iiiiiA
XIXDXMXMw
XIXDXMXDXMwL
33221111
3322112211
111log
1loglog


 (A.6) 
where swA / , )1/()1( sw cA    and   and s  are the fractions of stock-days with 
prosecuted manipulation in the population and sample respectively.  Note this weighted 
estimator does not require knowledge of the underlying rates of manipulation and detection; 
it merely accounts for the fact that we sample a different proportion of the observations in the 
observable sets A and Ac. 
                                                 
27 More precisely, we assume that the probability of detecting and prosecuting manipulation given that 
manipulation has not occurred is zero.  This assumption seems reasonable considering the strength of 
evidence required to prosecute closing price manipulators. 
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Appendix B: Alternative Models 
B.1 TWO-EQUATION (STANDARD DCE) MODEL OF MANIPULATION AND 
DETECTION 
 Using the same notation as for the three-equation model and omitting much of the 
explanation the two-equation model of manipulation and detection is as follows.   
 
iii XY 1111  

     (B.1) 





 

0
0
   if   (not)   0
ed)(manipulat   1
1
1
1 i
i
i Y
Y
Y     (B.2) 
iii XY 2222  

     (B.3) 





 

0
0
   if   (not)   0
(detected)   1
2
2
2 i
i
i Y
Y
Y     (B.4) 
    1Pr 111  ii YXM       (B.5)    1|1Pr 1222  iii YYXD      (B.6) 
 
    


Ai
iiA XDXML 2211loglog      (B.7) 
        


cAi
iiicA
XDXMXML 221111 11loglog       (B.8) 
             


cAi
iiicAAi
iiA XDXMXMwXDXMwL 2211112211 11logloglog   (B.9) 
 
 
B.2 THREE-EQUATION MODEL OF MANIPULTION AND DETECTION WITH 
EXPECTATIONS SIMULTANEITY  
 
iii XY 1111  

     (B.10) 





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
0
0
   if   (not)   0
ed)(manipulat   1
1
1
1 i
i
i Y
Y
Y     (B.11) 
   1Pr 111  ii YXM       (B.12) 
 
 
iiii XMXY 2211222  

    (B.13) 
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




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0
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    1|1Pr, 1221122  iiii YYXMXD     (B.15) 
 
 
iiii XMXY 3311333  

     (B.16) 





 

0
0
   if   (not)   0
detected)y (indirectl   1
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Y
Y     (B.17) 
    0,1|1Pr, 21331133  iiiii YYYXMXI     (B.18) 
 
Representing  11 iXM  by M ,   21122 ,  ii XMXD  by D  and   31133 ,  ii XMXI  
by I : 
  


Ai
A IDMMDL 1loglog         (B.19) 
     


cAi
cA
IDMML 111loglog       (B.20) 
        


cAi
cAAi
A IDMMwIDMMDwL 111log1loglog   (B.21) 
 
 
Appendix C: Summary of Manipulation Cases 
 
Case  Period of 
manipulation
Exchange Alleged misconduct Outcomes 
SEC v. Competitive Technologies, 
Inc. et al., Civil Action No. 304 CV 
1331 JCH (District of Connecticut) 
1-Jul-98  
to 
29-Jun-01 
AMEX A prolonged multi-faceted scheme carried out 
by several brokers, former brokers and 
company CEO in an attempt for the 
manipulators to enrich themselves and avoid 
margin calls. 
 
Conviction by a 
federal jury and 
settlements. 
 
In the Matter of RT Capital 
Management Inc. et al. 
30-Oct-98  
to 
31-Mar-99 
TSX Closing price manipulation of several stocks 
by several fund managers at the ends of 
reporting periods to inflate reported 
performance.  This enabled the fund to collect 
more management fees and earned the fund 
managers greater remuneration. 
 
Settlement, 
fines and 
suspensions. 
In the Matter of Spear, Leeds & 
Kellogg, L.P., Administrative 
Proceeding File No. 3-11189 / In the 
Matter of Baron Capital Inc. et al., 
Administrative Proceeding File No. 
3-11096 
 
18-Oct-99 
to 
1-Nov-99 
NYSE Closing price manipulation by a substantial 
shareholder during the pricing-period for a 
company acquisition. 
Settlement and 
fines. 
In the Matter of John Andrew Scott 
(OOS 2003-010) / In the Matter of  
Linda Grace Malinowski (OOS 
2003-011) / In the Matter of Matthew 
Philip Linden (OOS 2003-012) 
 
2-Feb-00 
to 
4-Jul-00 
TSX Manipulation of closing prices over a period 
of consecutive days in relation to an 
application for price protection. 
Settlements, 
fines and 
suspensions. 
In the Matter of Douglas Christie 
(OOS 2002-002) 
28-Feb-01  
to 
29-Jun-01 
TSX Manipulation of closing prices over a period 
of time to increase personal remuneration, 
which was paid by the trading firm based on 
market value of the trader’s inventory balance. 
 
Settlement and 
fines. 
In the Matter of Schultz Investment 
Advisors, Inc. and Scott Schultz, 
Administrative Proceeding File No. 
3-12136 
 
28-Jun-02  
to 
31-Dec-03  
NYSE Closing price manipulation by a fund manager 
at the ends of reporting periods.  This was 
done to inflate reported performance and 
subsequently collect more management fees. 
 
Settlement, fine 
and suspension. 
In the Matter of Alfred Simon 
Gregorian (DN 2006-003) / In the 
Matter of Research Capital 
Corporation (DN 2006-005) 
12-Nov-03 
to 
24-Dec-03 
TSX-V Manipulation of the closing prices of a single 
stock over a period of time to create a 
misleading appearance of strength and 
stability in the market for the company’s 
shares.  
  
Settlement, 
fines and 
suspensions. 
In the Matter of Luc St Pierre 
(IIROC No. 11) 
1-Oct-04 
to 
30-Sep-05 
TSX-V Manipulation of the closing prices of two 
stocks over a period of time on behalf of 
anonymous sophisticated investors and a 
company director.  
Conviction by a 
Disciplinary 
Panel, fines and 
suspension.  
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Table I. Numerical example of incomplete detection and model identification 
The numbers in the table represent frequencies of individuals in a hypothetical population of 100.  RA is 
risk aversion. 
Panel A: True state of the world 
   IQ 
   High Low 
Yes (low RA) 10 10 
Manipulator 
No (high RA) 40 40 
Panel B: Non-random detection of manipulators 
   IQ 
   High Low 
Detected 1 9 
Yes (low RA)
Not detected 9 1 Manipulator 
No (high RA) 40 40 
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Table II. Definitions of variables 
This table defines the variables used in the models of manipulation and detection.  The third column reports the transformation 
that is applied to the raw data to normalize and scale the variables.  Where required by the transformation negative values are 
multiplied by negative one before and after applying the transformation.  
Variable Definition Transform
Panel A: Variables associated with both manipulation and detection 
Detected 
manipulation  
Dummy variable for any of the 184 instances of detected and prosecuted closing price manipulation. 
 
 
 
Exchange Four dummy variables for each of the exchanges American Exchange (AMEX), New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE), Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX), TSX Venture Exchange (TSX-V).   
 
 
Industry Ten dummy variables based on the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) to represent the industry of a 
stock.  The industries are (1) oil and gas, (2) basic materials, (3) industrials, (4) consumer goods, (5) health 
care, (6) consumer services, (7) telecommunications, (8) utilities, (9) financials and (10) technology.   
 
 
Panel B: Variables associated primarily with manipulation 
Market 
capitalization  
Share price multiplied by the number of ordinary shares in issue. The amount on issue is updated whenever 
new tranches of stock are issued or after a capital change.  Calculated on the first day of each month in 
USD million. 
 
)log(  
Turnover 
 
 
Median daily traded US dollar volume in the stock in the previous month (in USD million).  Alternative 
definitions used for robustness tests: 
Turnover (2) - median number of trades per day in previous month. 
Turnover (3) - median daily US dollar volume traded in previous month divided by market capitalization. 
 
)log(  
 
)ln(  
)log(  
ILLIQ Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure, defined as the average (for each stock-month) of the ratio of daily 
absolute return to daily traded dollar volume. 
)log(  
 
Spread The median of the past month’s daily mean proportional spreads for that stock.  Daily mean proportional 
spreads are calculated as the equal weighted mean of the difference between the best bid and ask divided 
by the bid-ask midpoint price at every quote update and trade. 
 
  
Analyst coverage The total number of IBES analyst forecasts of that financial year’s earnings per share (EPS).  Calculated 
on the first day of each month in number of forecasts. 
 
  
Index stock Dummy variable for whether a stock is a constituent of either of the indices Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 
500 or S&P/TSX Composite Index (TSE 300 Index prior to May 2002).  Calculated on the first day of 
each month. 
 
 
Fund holdings Percentage of shares held by mutual funds.  Calculated for each stock semi-annually based on mutual 
funds’ compulsory filings with the SEC (N-30D filings) using the Thomson-Reuters Mutual Fund 
Database, also known as CDA/Spectrum S12.  The filings cover almost all US mutual funds plus about 
3,000 global funds that hold in US and Canadian stocks. 
 
 
SEO Dummy variable for the one-month period leading up to the issue date of a secondary equity offering 
(SEO) in a stock.   
 
 
Optionable Dummy variable for whether the stock has options trading on it that expire within a month.   
 
 
Option expiry Dummy variable for whether an optionable stock is in its last day of trade before options on that stock 
expire.   
 
 
Trend Close to close return over previous calendar month. 
 
3   
Month-end  Dummy variable for the last trading day of a month. 
 
 
Quarter-end  Dummy variable for the last trading day of a quarter, that is, the last trading days in the months of March, 
June, September and December. 
 
 
Volatility Idiosyncratic realized volatility, defined as the standard deviation of the stock’s previous month’s residuals 
from the standard capital asset pricing model applied to daily close-to-close returns.  Alternative definition 
used for robustness tests: standard deviation of the stock’s previous month’s daily close-to-close returns. 
  
  
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Table II (continued) 
Variable Definition Transform 
Panel C: Variables associated primarily with detection 
Prosecutions  Number of closing price manipulation prosecutions filed by the market regulators in that country in the 
previous year (rolling one year window) based on the date of filling the statement of allegations. 
 
 
Regulatory 
budget  
Budget of the principal government regulator divided by the number of common stocks for which the 
regulator is responsible.  The principal regulator for AMEX and NYSE is the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and for TSX and TSX-V it is the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC).  Budgets are 
taken from the annual reports of the regulators for each regulator’s financial year, deflated by the OECD 
published CPI of the corresponding country and converted to US dollars.  The units of this variable are 
’00,000s of US dollars in real (August 1998) terms per common stock. 
 
 
Abnormal return 
(AR) 
 
Abnormal day-end return calculated as return from bid-ask midpoint 30 minutes before close to closing 
price (or in the absence of any trades in the last 30 minutes then midpoint at time of last trade to closing 
price) less that stock’s previous month’s median value.  Alternative definitions used for robustness tests:  
AR2a, AR2b, AR2c - as per AR1 but using last 60, 10 and 5 minutes of trading in place of 30 minutes. 
AR3 - abnormal daily return calculated as close to close return less that stock’s previous month’s median 
value. 
 
  
 
 
  
  
Reversion (RV) Overnight price reversion calculated as return from closing price to next morning’s 11am bid-ask midpoint 
price. 
 
  
Order imbalance 
(OIB) 
 
Day-end order imbalance, defined as the dollar volume of buyer-initiated trades less the dollar volume of 
seller-initiated trades during the last 30 minutes before close, divided by the total dollar volume that day 
(to allow comparison across different sized stocks).  Has range [0,1].  
Alternative definitions used for robustness tests:  
OIB2 - as per OIB but using number of trades in place of dollar volume. 
OIB3 - as per OIB but using share volume in place of dollar volume. 
OIB4a, OIB4b – as per OIB but using last 10 and 5 minutes of trading in place of 30 minutes. 
 
 
AR time-series  Abnormal day-end return aggregated over a period of time for a particular stock.  Calculated as median 
value of AR for that stock in a two-week period starting seven days back in time and ending seven days 
forward in time.  Alternative definitions used for robustness tests:  
AR2 time-series – as per AR time-series but using AR2 in place of AR. 
AR3 time-series – as per AR time-series but using AR3 in place of AR. 
 
  
 
 
  
  
RV time-series  
 
Reversion aggregated over a period of time for a particular stock.  Calculated as median value of RV for 
that stock in a two-week period starting seven days back in time and ending seven days forward in time.   
  
  
OIB time-series 
 
Day-end order imbalance aggregated over a period of time for a particular stock.  Calculated as median 
value of OIB for that stock in a two-week period starting seven days back in time and ending seven days 
forward in time.  Alternative definitions used for robustness tests:  
OIB2 time-series – as per OIB time-series but using OIB2 in place of OIB. 
OIB3 time-series – as per OIB time-series but using OIB3 in place of OIB. 
 
  
 
 
  
  
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Table III. Specification of models 
This table defines which variables are used in each of the equations for the three models.  Model 1 is a 
three-equation modified detection controlled estimation (DCE) model, Model 2 is a standard two-equation 
DCE model and Model 3 is a modified three-equation DCE model with expectations simultaneity.  M( ) is 
the probability of manipulation, D( ) is the conditional probability of direct detection (conditional 
probability of detection in the standard two-equation DCE model) and I( ) is the conditional probability of 
indirect detection.  Variables are defined in Table II.  The symbol + indicates a variable is included as a 
factor in the corresponding probability.  
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Variable 
M( ) D( ) I( )  M( ) D( )  M( ) D( ) I( ) 
Exchange + + +  + +  + + + 
Industry + + +  + +  + + + 
Market capitalization  +    +   +   
Turnover +    +   +   
ILLIQ +    +   +   
Spread +    +   +   
Volatility +    +   +   
Analyst following  +    +   +   
Index stock +    +   +   
Fund holdings +    +   +   
SEO +    +   +   
Optionable +    +   +   
Option expiry +    +   +   
Trend +    +   +   
Month-end  +    +   +   
Quarter-end  +    +   +   
Prosecutions  + + +  + +  + + + 
Regulatory budget  + + +  + +  + + + 
Abnormal return (AR)  +    +   +  
Reversion (RV)  +    +   +  
Order imbalance (OIB)  +    +   +  
AR time-series    +   +    + 
RV time-series    +   +    + 
OIB time-series   +   +    + 
M( )         + + 
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Table IV. Summary statistics 
This table reports summary statistics for variables used in the model of manipulation and detection.  The 
variables are defined in Table II.  Raw data are actual observed values whereas Normalized and scaled are 
values after applying normalizing transformations to the variables.  Detected manipulation refers to the 
sample of stock-days in which manipulation has been detected and prosecuted by a regulator (Yes) and the 
sample of stock-days without detected and prosecuted manipulation (No). Medians and standard deviations 
(Std dev) are not reported for binary variables.  The units of the raw data are in parentheses under the variable 
names.   
 Raw data  Normalized and scaled 
Variable 
Detected 
manipulation Mean Std dev Median  Mean Std dev Median
Panel A: Variables associated with both manipulation and detection 
Exchange (AMEX) Yes  0.17 0.17  
   (Binary) No  0.13 0.13  
Exchange (TSX) Yes  0.46 0.46  
   (Binary) No  0.25 0.25  
Exchange (TSX-V) Yes  0.20 0.20  
   (Binary) No  0.05 0.05  
Exchange (NYSE) Yes  0.18 0.18  
   (Binary) No  0.56 0.56  
Panel B: Variables associated primarily with manipulation 
Market capitalization Yes  442 1,579 67 2.01 0.58 1.83
   (USD million) No  2,963 12,737 236 2.39 1.01 2.37
Turnover Yes  0.97 4.98 0.08 4.96 0.61 4.89
   (USD million) No  8.07 31.29 0.21 5.43 1.29 5.31
ILLIQ Yes  0.48 0.36 0.47 2.09 1.56 2.02
   (% / USD10,000) No  0.36 0.43 0.07 1.54 1.87 0.31
Spread Yes  2.71 1.44 2.56 1.57 0.49 1.60
   (%) No  2.32 3.68 0.88 1.22 0.91 0.94
Analyst coverage Yes  1.63 4.42 0.00 0.62 1.12 0.00
   (Count) No  3.93 5.94 1.00 1.32 1.48 1.00
Fund holdings Yes  5.45 8.50 1.12 5.45 8.50 1.12
   (%) No  11.98 13.2 6.98 11.98 13.2 6.98
Trend Yes  2.81 22.1 1.59 0.21 2.35 1.17
   (%) No  -0.14 17.5 0.00 0.01 2.06 0.00
Volatility Yes  1.87 1.90 1.48 1.10 0.82 1.21
   (%) No  3.39 3.80 2.18 1.67 0.78 1.48
Index stock Yes  0.11 0.11  
   (Binary) No  0.18 0.18  
SEO Yes  0.013 0.013  
   (Binary) No  0.006 0.006  
Optionable Yes  0.09 0.09  
   (Binary) No  0.28 0.28  
Option expiry Yes  0.00 0.00  
   (Binary) No  0.01 0.01  
Month-end Yes  0.31 0.31  
   (Binary) No  0.05 0.05  
Quarter-end Yes  0.20 0.20  
   (Binary) No  0.02 0.02  
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Table IV (continued) 
 Raw data  Normalized and scaled 
Variable 
Detected 
manipulation Mean Std dev Median  Mean Std dev Median 
Panel C: Variables associated primarily with detection 
Prosecutions Yes  0.47 0.66 0.00 0.47 0.66 0.00
   (Count) No  0.73 0.99 0.00 0.73 0.99 0.00
Regulatory budget Yes  58.1 75.5 9.80 0.58 0.76 0.10
   (USD100,000 / stock) No  130 90.9 165 1.30 0.91 1.65
Abnormal return (AR) Yes  1.24 2.39 0.86 0.72 1.17 0.93
   (%) No  0.04 2.54 0.00 0.01 1.06 0.00
Reversion (RV) Yes  1.55 3.72 1.71 0.93 1.40 1.31
   (%) No  -0.19 3.66 0.00 -0.05 1.39 0.00
Order imbalance (OIB) Yes  0.11 0.25 0.02 0.11 0.25 0.02
   (Dimensionless ratio) No  0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00
AR time series Yes  0.20 0.77 0.14 0.20 0.72 0.37
   (%) No  0.01 1.17 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.00
RV time series Yes  1.15 1.28 1.12 0.81 0.85 1.06
   (%) No  -0.17 1.78 0.00 -0.06 0.91 0.00
OIB time series Yes  0.01 0.04 0.00 0.15 0.45 0.00
   (Dimensionless ratio) No  0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.15 0.00
Observations Yes  184           
  No   1,249,748
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Table V. Model estimation 
This table reports the results of the estimation of the models.  Model 1 is a three-equation modified DCE model, Model 2 is a standard 
two-equation DCE model and Model 3 is a modified three-equation DCE model with expectations simultaneity.  M( ) is the 
probability of manipulation, D( ) is the conditional probability of direct detection (detection in the standard two-equation DCE model) 
and I( ) is the conditional probability of indirect detection.  Variables are defined in Table II.  Numbers not in brackets are the 
coefficient estimates.  Numbers in brackets are the marginal effects (partial derivatives of the corresponding probability with respect 
to each of the variables, reported as a percentage of the estimated corresponding probability).  Pseudo R-squared is McFadden’s 
likelihood ratio index (one minus the ratio of the log-likelihood with all predictors and the log-likelihood with intercepts only).  
Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is indicated by *, ** and *** respectively. 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Variable M( ) D( ) I( )  M( ) D( )  M( ) D( ) I( ) 
Regulatory budget -2.01*** 1.69*** 6.48** -2.11*** 1.59*** -2.01*** 1.68** 6.49**
 (-1.98) (1.63) (6.14) (-2.09) (1.52) (-1.99) (1.62) (6.14)
Analyst coverage -0.37***  -0.42*** -0.38*** 
 (-0.36)  (-0.42) (-0.38) 
Index stock -1.22***  -1.29*** -1.22*** 
 (-1.21)  (-1.28) (-1.21) 
Fund holdings -0.08***  -0.09*** -0.08*** 
 (-0.08)  (-0.09) (-0.08) 
Market capitalization 0.73***  0.71*** 0.73*** 
 (0.72)  (0.71) (0.72) 
ILLIQ -0.43***  -0.37*** -0.44*** 
 (-0.43)  (-0.37) (-0.44) 
Month-end (ME) 1.02***  0.71** 1.01*** 
 (1.01)  (0.70) (0.99) 
Quarter-end (QE) 1.09***  0.70 1.07*** 
 (1.07)  (0.69) (1.06) 
ME * Fund holdings 0.06***  0.08*** 0.06*** 
 (0.06)  (0.08) (0.06) 
QE * Fund holdings 0.04*  0.05* 0.04* 
 (0.04)  (0.05) (0.04) 
Volatility -0.98***  -0.69*** -0.93*** 
 (-0.97)  (-0.69) (-0.92) 
Abnormal return (AR)  0.85*** 0.71***  0.84***
  (0.82) (0.68)  (0.81)
Reversion (RV)  0.30*** 0.27***  0.29***
  (0.29) (0.25)  (0.28)
Order imbalance (OIB)  1.43** 1.10  1.41**
  (1.37) (1.05)  (1.36)
AR time series   3.17*** 0.25  3.18***
   (3.00) (0.24)  (3.01)
RV time series   7.64*** 1.10***  7.66***
   (7.23) (1.05)  (7.24)
OIB time series   3.12 0.03  3.12
   (2.95) (0.03)  (2.95)
M( )    0.14*** 0.01
Exchange dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,249,932 1,249,932 1,249,932
Pseudo R-squared  0.23 0.17 0.23
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Table VI. Bootstrap-based corrections for double-clustered errors and finite-sample bias 
This table reports the results of Model 1 (the three-equation modified DCE model from Table V) estimated 
using a reduced random sample and bootstraps of 500 replications each.  Double-clustered errors uses a 
bootstrap algorithm that provides consistent standard error estimates when errors cluster by stock and by 
date.  Bias-corrected estimates uses a bootstrap algorithm that corrects parameter estimates for nonlinear 
estimator finite-sample bias.  M( ) is the probability of manipulation, D( ) is the conditional probability of 
direct detection and I( ) is the conditional probability of indirect detection.  Variables are defined in Table 
II.  Numbers not in brackets are the coefficient estimates.  Numbers in brackets are the marginal effects 
(partial derivatives of the corresponding probability with respect to each of the variables, reported as a 
percentage of the estimated corresponding probability).  Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is 
indicated by *, ** and *** respectively. 
 Double-clustered errors  Bias-corrected estimates 
Variable M( ) D( ) I( )  M( ) D( ) I( ) 
Regulatory budget -2.06*** 1.77*** 6.51*** -1.87*** 1.69*** 6.68***
 (-2.04) (1.69) (6.18) (-1.86) (1.60) (5.95)
Analyst following -0.12* -0.16*   
 (-0.12) (-0.16)   
Index stock -1.22*** -1.24***   
 (-1.21) (-1.23)   
Fund holdings -0.07*** -0.07***   
 (-0.07) (-0.07)   
Market capitalization 0.83*** 0.77***   
 (0.82) (0.76)   
ILLIQ -0.12 -0.14   
 (-0.12) (-0.14)   
Month-end (ME) 1.56*** 1.41***   
 (1.54) (1.40)   
Quarter-end (QE) 1.70*** 1.44***   
 (1.69) (1.43)   
ME * Fund holdings 0.03*** 0.04***   
 (0.03) (0.04)   
QE * Fund holdings 0.01 0.01   
 (0.01) (0.01)   
Volatility -2.37*** -2.05***   
 (-2.35) (-2.04)   
Abnormal return (AR)  1.22*** 1.21***  
  (1.17) (1.15)  
Reversion (RV)  0.45*** 0.45***  
  (0.43) (0.42)  
Order imbalance (OIB)  1.86*** 2.38***  
  (1.78) (1.24)  
AR time series  3.01**  2.14***
  (2.86)  (3.67)
RV time series  7.79***  7.47***
  (7.40)  (7.62)
OIB time series  3.26***  3.27***
  (3.10)  (3.06)
Exchange dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,681 12,681 
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Figure 1. Modified detection controlled estimation model. 
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